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OPTIHAL GROWTH AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND CAPITAL 
Milind H. Lele and James L. McCabe 
Introduction* 
Policy makers, some argue, should not be concerned with the fact that 
income distribution becomes more uneven during the early stages of development. 
For one thing, there is the view that changing income distribution may be a 
consequence of the norma.l change in output composition during this period [13]. 
Rising per-capita product is generally accompanied by a rising share of non­
agricultural output. If the non.,agricultural sector is associated with an 
income distribution which is less even than th~t in agriculture, the change 
in sectoral weighting will cause the distribution of aggregate income to 
become more dispersed. In a.ddition, it has been argued that in order for an 
economy to grow rapidly, income must become more unevenly distributed 
over time. Several economists have stressed the importance of an uneven 
distribution of income which favors entrepreneurs [10] nnd [14]. They 
contend that such a distribution, which is associated with industrialization, 
facilitates the mobilization of savings et low levels of per-capita product. 
At an opposite pole to this ,dew is the conte:1.tion that government 
policies designed to re-distri~ute income early in the development process 
may increase both et:1ployment and output gro•vth. The main point is that 
just as the distribution cf incc!:le is &ffect8d by the composition of output, 
income distribution also influerace.s the bill of goods which is demanded. 
*We would like to tha::k Professor Kenneth J, Arrow and Moises Syrquin 
for invaluable comments and criticism" 
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As income becomes more evenly distributed, it is suggested that the demand 
for labor-intensive goods rises relative to demand for capital intensive 
goods. Moreover, this hypothesis has some empirical support which is 
brought out in Cline's study of two Latin American countries [7]. Thus, 
since economic systems are generally characterized by a surplus of labor in 
their early stages of development, policies which distribute income more 
evenly may increase aggregate output--as a consequence of their effect on 
factor opportunity cost. 
According to this line of argument, other effects associated with a 
more even distribution of income would more than offset whatever dampening 
effect a lower level of private savj_ngs due to less inequality may have 
on growth. The level of total savings may be preserved by higher tax 
revenues and increased public savings. A more even distribution of income 
would cause the demand for imports to be reduced at a given level of per-capita 
income; therefore, it would reduce the impact of one of the main constraints 
on growth. Finally, the changes in output composition stemming from decreased 
income dispersion would reduce the aggregate capital-output ratio and the level 
1of saving necessary to achieve a given growth ratec 
A third view of income distribution emphasizes that growth and equity 
may be conflicting objectives and that the choice of an approriate mix is an 
integral part of the problem of social welfare maximizationo 2 Berry describes 
1
Most of these ideas are expressed in [11, pp. 139-155]. 
2
Berry points out that the possibility of a conflict between production 
maximization and distribution improvement rests upon the assumption that 
fiscal redistribution is relatively costlyc In Berry's words, " ••• it is not pos­
sible to maximize production~ forgetting about the distribution implicit in 
the particular way in which production is generated, and then redistribute 
income as seems appropriate after the fact of the production process"[4, p. 5]. 
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this situation as follows: 
The relation between the two variables can be expressed in a 
'possibilities curve,' where quantity of distribution is somehow 
measured on one axis and output growth on another; if the two are 
in conflic•t the 'possibilities curve' will have a negative slope. 
Since we may assume that a community indifference curve between the 
two would also have a negative slope, a tangency would, as in a 
regular indifference curve-production possibilities curve diagram, 
indicate the social optimum [4, p. 5]. 
The purpose of our paper is three-fold: (1) to isolate conditions 
under which any particular one of the three views just described may be 
consistent with an optimal income distribution path over time; (2) to 
demonstrate that a model which allows for the social costs of adjustment to 
reduced levels of private saving may have more than one turnpike; and (3) to 
show the sensitivity of the short-run and long-run grmvth paths to the 
weight given to dispersion in the welfare function. 
We restrict ourselves to trading off only two effects of reduced 
income dispersion, those involving factor opportunity cost and savings. 
1The others described above have not be;n adequately supported empirically. 
The problem consists of maximizing an integral of instantaneous welfare 
subject to two dynamic equations and initial and terminal conditions on the 
capital-labor ratio and the distribution of capital. The problem is designed 
1
Cline [7] shows that in the two Latin American countries examined, 
Brazil and Mexico, the impact of improvements in income distribution on the 
demand for imports is negligible. On the other hand, in these two countries 
income equalization to the degree of equity of England produces a change in 
the composition of demand such that food and textiles make up a considerably 
larger share of total consumption. Given the high share of unprocessed 
food, these sectors are presumed to be relatively labor intensive, although 
Cline provides no conclnsive evidence linking equalization to an increase in 
the aggregate employment capital ratio. Cline also demonstrates that in 
some countries the household savings rate is positively correlated with 
income. 
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to provide insight into optimal trajectory of the standard deviation of the 
distribttion of capital (including land, physical, and human capital). 
Once this trajectory has been determined, along with that of the income tax 
schedule and the capital labor ratio, inferences may be drawn about changes 
in the standard deviation of the distribution of real income. 
In Section I, the model is described in detail. In Section II, the 
first-order conditions are derived and the turnpike properties of the system 
outlined. The last section gives the policy implications of the results. 
I. The Model 
Denote consumption per laborer of the jth household by cj, capital per 
laborer by kj, and non-capital income per laborer by wj. Then the function 
determining the consumption-labor ratio of the jth household may be written as 
(1.1) 
a > 0 0 < a < 1
0- - 1-
This function is consistent with a number of theories of consumption 
behavior. If it is assumed that the ratio of real cash balances to capital 
assets remains constant, then the relationship is similar to one proposed 
by Tobin (17) which makes consumption proportional to real wealth. If, on 
the other hand, individual households save in order to maintain a fixed ratio of 
capital assets to normal income, then, given no adjustment lag, a may be
1 
interpreted as the product of the reciprocal of this ratio and the marginal 
propensity to consume out of normal income. 
Non-capital income is untaxed and allocated completely to consumption 
expenditure. Since only the wages of unskilled labor are included in wj, 
this assumption of a unitary marginal propensity to consume may not be unrealistic. 
By subtracting consumption per laborer from total household income per 
laborer, we obtain the function 
sj yj + wj - cj(1.2) = D 
= -a + Yj - a kj0 D 1 
where sj is savings per laborer of the jth household and Yii is disposable 
capital income per laborer of the jth household. Denote aggregate 
domestic savings per laborer bys, disposable capital income per laborer 
by yD' and capital intensity by k, Then taking the expected value of (1.2) 
yields the aggregate savings function 
(1.3) s = -a + y - a k0 D 1 
For the sake of simplicity, net foreign capital inflow (which may be easily 
incorporated with the constant term a )is set equal to zero and the relationship0 
(1.4) i = s 
where i is gross investment per laborer, is assumed to hold as an identity. 
The production-demand relationshiR· Central to the model is a relationship 
giving gross domestic product per laborer as a function of the capital-labor 
ratio and the standard deviation of the distribution of capital. As Fisher [9] 
has shown, it is impossible to derive an aggregete production function when 
combining sectors which involve different commodities. Under certain condi­
tions, however, functions relating total capital stock and employment to 
the factor-price ratio and gross output in each sector may be derived 
-6-
by minimizing the cost functions of individual firms. 
These functions make up what has been referred to as a "minimum requirements" 
1isoquant and the basis for the production-demand relationship in our model. 
The function determining final demand per laborer in sector t (z )
1 
may be written as 
k w
(1.5) C , C , g, cr, P) 
k wwhere c is consumption per laborer financed out of capital income, c is 
consumption per laborer financed out of the wages of unskilled labor, 
cr is the standard deviation of the distribution of kj, and Pis the vector of 
_.commodity shadow prices. This function combines several relationships, 
each of which corresponds to a component of final demand. To begin with, 
investment and government consumption demands by sector are assumed to be 
functions of total investment and total government consumption respectively. 
Private consumption demand for a commodity produced in sector tis broken 
down into two components, c w and ck 
1
, representing the different forms of
1 
consumption finance. These components are determined by the functions 
(1.6) cw= e (cw, P) 
51, 1 -
k k
(1. 7) C = µ n (c , cr' P)
-1 J<., 
where ¢w =wand ck= a + a k. The wages of unskilled labor are equated
0 1 
111Minimum requirements" functions have been derived by Syrquin [16] 
in the case of a three-factor Cobb-Douglas production function. We assume that 
a linear input-output framework is applicable, which implies that the ratio 
of real value added to gross output remains constant in each sector. Consequently, 
the sector gross output vector may be included in the "minimum requirements" 
functions even though raw materials do not appear explicitly as a factor 
of production. 
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to the total consumption of this group. Since these payments are assumed to 
have a perfectly even distribution among households, no parameter of income 
dispersion enters (1.6).
1 ' 2 Exports net of imports in each sector are func­
tionally related to the shadow price of the commodity produced in the sector 
and the shadow price of foreign exchange. The latter variable is determined 
by requiring that the balance of payments identity be met (i.e., that the sum 
of the sectoral net exports equal zero). 
Factor prices, the GDP-labor ratio and the employment rate enter (1.5} 
implicitly. This may be demonstrated by examining the expressions for~, g, 
and!• Values for~ and g are given by the identities 
(1.8) w= w • e 
(1.9) g = y - Yn - w 
where w is the wage rate of unskilled labor, e is the employment rate and 
y is the GDP-labor ratio. 
The equation determining the vector of commodity shadow prices may be 
derived in the following manner: We assume that the form of the sectoral 
production functions is such that the value-added-gross output ratio in 
sector 1 (v
1
), may be expressed as a function of the two factor prices
3 
(1.10) v = h (w, r)
1 t 
where r is the rental return on capital. 
1One specific form of these functions may be derived as a simple 
extension of the consumption demand functions presented by Chenery and Raduchel (6], 
2A more general assumption would be that the standard deviation of these 
pfyments is constant and that this distribution is independent of that of the 
k'. This in no way affects the final results. 
¾alue added, acompiled by summing factor payments, may vary as 
a proportion of gross output, whereas real value added may not. Because of 
-7a-
Footnote #3 fE~~ 7 cont. 
the separability assumption implicit in the sectoral production functions, 
real value added may be set equal to the difference between gross output and 
intermediate inputsa See [15]. Factor payments are deflated by the GDP 
price index (pGDP) and the ratio of value added (V) to real value added 
(ViR) in sector i is given by the identity v /ViR = Piv/PGDP where P V1 1 
is the value added price index for commodity i. 
- -
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The shadow price of commodity i is equal to the direct and indirect unit 
costs of producing commodity t expressed in terms of the given set of factor prices. 
Thus, 
(1.11) P = a P + V 
where an element amt of the matrix a represents the amount of the mth 
commodity required to produce one unit of gross output in sector i and v 
is the vector of vts. Re-arranging this expression, we obtain 
-1 -1 
(1.12) P = (!. - a) _y = (.!, - a) h(w, r) 
where his the vector-valued function determining -:f...• 
By substituting (1.8), (1.9), and (1.12) into (1.5), we obtain 
(1.13) 
a linear transformation of these functions yields 
(1.14) 
where xis the vector of sectoral gross outputs and~ is the vector of 
sectoral final demands. The "minimum requirements" functions may be-written 
as 
w
(1.15) k = g (- x)r' -
(1.16) e = '¥ (w x)r' -
-9-
Substitution of (1.14) into these functions yields 
*
(1.17) k = g (w, r, k, e, o, y, yD) 
*(1.18) e = '¥ (w, r, k, e, o, y, yD) 
These functions are simplified in two ways. First, the labor supply 
function is assumed to take the fonn 
(1.19) e=e(w). 
e > o e < o
w WW 
Given that this function is monotone, we may write 
-1
(1.20) w = e (e). 
This function is bounded in the following way 
e -+ 
00Limit i w ~ 
Limit w + we + o 
where w is a politically determined minimum wage. 
Since the sum of factor payments equals real GDP 
(1.21) r = (y - w • e) /k 
By substituting this relationship into (1.17) and (1.18), the number of arguments
 
upon which k and e depend may be reduced significantly. 
The second way in which the functions determining k and e are simplified 
is by assuming that variations in the ratio of government consumption to gross 
investment (with the sum of i and g constant) do not affect k and e although 
they do affect output composition. The Yn variable enters equations (1.17) 
and (1.18) only through its effect on government consumption per laborer and 
gross investment per laborer. Now suppose that even though z R, depends on g 
Then the partialand i separately., K and e depend only upon the sum of g and i. 
derivatives of (1. 17) and (1. 18) with respect to y0 wi




The assumption that, cet. par., e and k are insensitive to variations in 
Yn is tenable. It may be argued that factor proportions in the sector producing 
capital goods are quite similar to those in the sector producing goods and 
services consumed by the government. For example, the average ratio of physical 
capital to output in both sectors may be relatively low particularly if a high 
weight is given to construction in the capital goods sector. 
Under these assmnptions, equations (1.17) and (1.18) may be re-written as 
* k = g (k, e, cr, y) 
* e = t (k, e, cr, y) 
Given that the system has a unique solution, these relationships may be used 
to detennine e and y in terms of k and cr. The function determining GDP per 
laborer may be expressed as 
(1. 23) y = f(k, cr) 
It can be shown that, under certain conditions, the derivatives of this function 
have the following properties 
f < 0 crcr -
For any given value of k we must also require that (1. 23) is maximized by 
ae 
a non-negative value of cr. A problem may arise in the case when (30
) < o where 
the derivative is evaluated for values of cr greater than the optimum. If e 
approaches unity before cr reaches zero, we would expect this derivative to 
change sign. Under these conditions, the (w) ratio will approach infinity. r 
If, however, the system is far from full employment as cr approaches zero, a 
negative value of cr may maximize (1.23) for a given value of k. 
1 
1A theoretical argument may be made that both o and k should enter the labor 
supply function as well as w. This function would then be written as 
e = e* (k, cr, w) 
The avoidance of a corner solution would require e* to be sufficiently large as 
o, approaches zero such that (ae) a > oLimit a -+ o acr l'.k = o 
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The Dynamics 
The capital accumulation equation of the individual household takes the form 
(1.24) 




One possible tax function is 
(1.27) 
which can be written as 
(1.28) . r . 
II 
the coefficientThe coefficient a determines the revenue impact of the tax and 
0 
a determines the re-distributive effect of the tax. Substituting (1.28)
1 
into (1.26) yields 
II 11 
kj = - a + r {kj - ae - a (kj - k)}(1.29) 
0 1 r 
- (a + n + o) kj
1 
Denote GDP by Y and aggregate capital stock by K. As 
(1.30) 
we have II 
II 
. j a 0{kj (kj - k)}(1.31) k = - a + fk (k, cr) - fk - al0 






• t:,, 1 j d j
(1.34) a ,: -o 
E { (k - k) • dt 
(k - k) } 
we have 
(1.35) k = - a + f (k a) [ k - a]o k ' o 
(1. 36) 
We define the state variable I; by the equation 
1 - a = r;1 
The control variables are given by the relationships 










Note that u1 is o
nly a pseudo-control variable. In fact, it is the 
intercept of the net tax function (i.e., the expected net tax) which t
he 
government controls, not its capitaliz~d value.
1 
1It is assumed that the government controls a0 
II 
directly, whereas it influences 
only the change in the re-distribution coefficient a1• T
his allows for the fact 
that the government regulates the level of gross investment by varying
 the govem­
ment sa'Jings rate as well as net revenue. On the assumption that pub
lic capital
11 





ment investment, may be substituted for a •0 
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The Criterion Function 
Denote consumption (public and private) per laborer by c. 




The inclusion of per capita consumption in (1.42) is certainly conventional. 
However, the same thing may not be said about the inclusion of u1 and a • 
.Arrow and Kurz (3] adduce a number of reasons why the ratio of government 
capital to labor should be included in the welfare function in addition to con­
sumption per laborer. One of the most important of these is the effect of 
external economies arising from public capital which is not allowed for in the 
production-demand relationship. In general, it is clear that the benefits of 
government expena.i ture are not correctly valued in the national accounts; the 
specific direction of bias is uncertain. 
The usual assumption about the savings impact of redistribution is not 
valid in the context of our model unless the benefits of government expenditure 
are understated. This assumption implies that a more even distribution of capital 
and income increases the social cost of saving. To reach this conclusion one 
must assume that the ca~italized value of current government expenditure has 
a positive effect on welfare which goes beyond its contribution to total con-
sumption, (i.e., U > 0). otherwise, the government cculd compensate
UJ_ 
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for whatever decrease in private savings resulted from an equalization of 
capital holdings at no social cost. This would be accomplished simply by 
reducing current government expenditures. 
The inclusion of cr in the welfare function is highly debatable. It may 
not be feasible to determine the effect of changes in the distribution of 
income on social welfare. Difficulties arising from interpersonal comparisons 
of utility and the use of voting are outlined by Arrow in (2]. 




-yt U (c, u1 ,
 cr) dt 
where y is the rate of social discount and Tis the planning horizon.
1 Thus 
the paths of optimal capital accmnulation and distribution are given by the 
solution(s) of the following optimal control problem: 
'f 






lThe planning horizon, T, is assumed to be sufficiently large so that in 
the discussions of equilibrium solutions, the finiteness of '1' has little effect. 
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and the constraints 
(1.49) k ~ o, o ~ o, s > o 
(1.50) o ..'.:. u1 ..'.:. - a + {fk(k, cr) - a1} k0 
·fk(k, cr) 
(1.51) A..'.:. u 2 ..'.:. B 
with A < o , B > 0 
The upper bound on u1 z refl
ects the fact the gross investment per laborer 
cannot be less than zero. The constraints on u2 indica
te that it is impossible 
to change the progressiveness of the tax instantaneously. As we shall show in 
the next section, these constraints are not germane to the rest of our discussion. 
II. Equilibrium Growth Paths 
We shall consider two cases. The first is based on the assumption that 
the partial derivatives of U with respect of u1 z and 
cr are zero. The second 
concerns a more general situation in which U is a function of both u1 and cr 
explicitly. 
The optimal control problem referred to in the previous section is linear 
in the controls u1 and
 u2; th
us the optimal policies will be of the "bang­
singular-bang" type [5, pp. 261-65], i.e., the controls will move between their 
boundary values and an interior value(s) corresponding to the singular arc(s). 
From the usual definition of equilibrium growth [1], we can see that the 
equilibrium solutions, if any, will be along the singular arcs; the constraints 
(1.49) and (1.50) are thus of no consequence as long as the equilibrium value 
-16-
of the capital intensity can be attained without u going to zero. On the
1 
singular arc, when H = o, the necessary conditions for optimality are derived 
u 
from a Hamiltonian of the form 
(2 .1) 
Thus we have 





(2.5) - "0 = u {fa - fka (k - ul)}C 
- " {n + o + y + a.1 - f z; - f ad a k kcr 
+ "k fkcr (k - ul) 
and 
(2 .6) = - Y" + f a A a- "i:; z; k ... 
In addition, we have the dynamics which are given by equations (1.46), (1.47) 
and (1.48). 




(a.1 + n + o)k + a(2. 7) = k - 0ul 
fk (k, 0) 
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(2.8) u2 = o 
r; =n+o+a.1(2.9) 
fk (k, a) 
Also, 
(2.10) " k = UC 
(2.11) "r; = 0 
Then from 
(2 .12) 
We have, assuming, , fk (k, a) i o 
(2 .13) " cr = o 
The two remaining variables are k, cr. These can be obtained from (2.4) 
and (2.5), giving 
(2.14) 
(2.15) f (k, a) = ocr 
In equation (2.14), we have the familiar modified golden rule condition. 
The second signifies that the derivative of the production demand relationship 
with respect to a is zero. 
In order for a modified golden rule equilibrium to exist at the same time 
as the constraints on u1 and~




This implies that both u is greater than zero and that~ is less than 1.1 
If this condition is not met, the steady-state optimum can be attained only 
if "forced savings" (i.e., a negative u1) and/or posit
ive net foreign capital 
inflow are present. (Inclusion of the latter effect would cause a to be 0 
1smaller.) 
It can be seen that, in this case~ the equilibria are unique, provided 
that fk(k, a) is concave ink and a • However, if the function U(c) is altered 
so as to include the effects of u1 and cr , i.e., 
(2 .17) 
the following changes occur. 
Equation (2.2) becomes 
{2.2)' 
and (2.5) becomes 
(2.5)' + u cr 
The equilibrium conditions are now 
(2. 7) ' 
(2. 8) ' 
1Recall the regularity condition that for any given value of K the value of 
a which maximizes f{k,cr) is non-negative. This condition implies that 
f {k, cr) ='oat cr > o. 
a 
-19-
(2.9) ' l;; = 
(2.10) ' 
' (2 .11) 
(2.13) ' "- = 0 0 
I u (n + o + y + 
(2.14) fk (k, o) = n + o + y + ul a.1 - (n + cS) .{
u fk (k, cr) 2 
C fk(k,cr) 
k • fkk - 1} 
u a }f (k, cr) . { (n + cS + a.1) k - uul(2 .15) ' f (k, o) = - { kcr 0 } -:'Z:'r-a 
O' u 




Clearly, more than one combination of k and cr may satisfy these conditions. 
Aside from the possibility of multiple turnpikes, these conditions differ 
from the ones obtained earlier in other respects. From (2.10), observe that 
the modified golden rule condition never holds. Since fkk < o, in equilibrium 
the inequality 
fk (k, cr) > n + o + y 
must be satisfied provided that U > o. Again in contrast to the previous 
ul 
results, the partial derivative of the production demand relationship with respect 
to cr need not equal zero along the turnpike. 
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This is true simply because the effect of a change in o on welfare goes 
i 
beyond its effect on consumption per laborer. Condition (2.15) states that 
the increase (decrease) in welfare due to an increase (decrease) in consumption 
, must equal the sum of the two other welfareper laborer, f 
0 
(k, o) • U
C 
effects resulting from a change in o. The first is the partial derivative of 
the welfare with respect too multiplied by -1. The second is the change in 
welfare stemming from the change in the level of u1 necessa
ry to maintain the 
equilibrium capital intensity; this value is given by the term 
fk (k, o) [(n + o + a 1) k - a] { 0 0 } 
(k, o) 
A relevant example is the case where f 0 < o. 
Here the social value of the rise 
in consumption per laborer due to a decline in o must equal the social value of 
the loss in capitalized government expenditures net of the direct welfare gain. 
Although the equilibriun value of Ua 
does affect cr, it has no effect on t 
or u1 since f
k (k, cr) is independent of U Thus, the coefficients of the0 
net tax equation may be determined in the case of the long-run optimal trajectory 
without knowing effect of changes in o on social welfare. 
III. Conclusion 
The standard deviation of the distribution of disposable income per laborer 
(oy)' in a steady-state equilibrium is a linear function of cr. For, from (1.25) 
we see that the total disposable income (which is the sum of income from capital 
y0
, and wage income w) is given by 
Total disposable income= r. k + w - Expected net tax. 
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Then, noting the fact that wage income w, is assumed to be uniformly distributed, 
we see that 
Then from (2.9) 
cry= (n + o + a1) . a 
The optimal trajectory fork, a, and a depends on where the initial valuesy 
for these two variables lie relative to the steady-state optimum values given 
by (2 .14) 
1 
and (2. 15) 
V 
• In the case where one or more turnpikes exist and the 
initial condition for a lies below all the steady-state optimum values, it will 
be optimal to increase capital dispersion initially. If the terminal condition 
on cr requires that it lie below the turnpike values, then the optimal path 
for cr will arch toward the turnpike value and then eventually arch down to 
the terminal value. Assuming that the initial and terminal values for o satisfy 
two different steady-state equilibrium conditions, ay will fo
llow a similar 
pattern. This trajectory is comparable to that observed historically by 
Kuznets [12]. 
The view that income equalization and economic growth are consistent objectives 
holds true when, given that U is zero everywhere, welfare may be maximized by 
(J 
increasing k and simultaneously lowering a. Under these circumstances the incre-
ment in welfare due to the expansionary effect which a decline in dispersion 
per laborer must outweigh the social cost of the decline in capitalizedhas on GDP 
government expenditures necessary to keep k constant. Since the initial value 
of k is below the optimum, we are assured that this condition will not be met 
by a downward adjustment in both k and a which could lead to a decrease in GPP 
per laborer. However, in many cases, finding the optimal trajectory for cr will not 
be so simple. In this paper we have indicated that when U is non-zero, multipleul 
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turnpikes may exist; thus, the initial value of a will depend upon a variety 
of factors such as the proximity of the initial value to a given steady-state 
level, the stability of the various solutions and the initial condition on k. 
One interesting situation that may arise in the multiple-turnpike case 
appears to have a direct bearing on the effect of postponing income redistribution 
in developing countries. Consider the case when uu1 # 0 and the initial 
values of k and a lie between two turnpikes; along one k and a are larger than 
along the other. There is evidence to suggest that in developing countries 
income becomes more unevenly distributed as per capita consumption and the capital 
intensity rises. Thus by not deviating from the normal pattern of increasing 
capital accumulation at the expense of further dispersion, policy makers may 
reach a stage beyond which income equalization may no longer be optimal. In 
other words, postponing re-distribution may lead the society to a set of initial 
conditions from which it is optimal to arch towards the turnpike with the higher 
value of a, whereas a trajectory with a lower value of income dispersion may 
have been possible in the past. 
One final point that should be made is that the fonn of the welfare function 
may affect the equilibrium values of a without affecting the optimal trajectory 
oft (which is equal to one minus the re-distribution coefficient, a1). Thus 
when the initial value of the re-distribution coefficient lies below the relevant 
turnpike, it is optimal to set a1 at its 
upper bound until the turnpike is 
reached. and conversely for the case when the initial value lies above. Moreover, 
the turnpike value of a1 is inde
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